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TAXATION OF REAL PROPERTY IN COOK
COUNTY UNDER THE CONSTITUTION OF 1970
by Richard Wattling*
The Revenue Article of the 1970 Illinois Constitution1 has
worked, or more precisely will work, substantial changes in the
taxation of real property in Cook County. It replaces the preexisting system of de facto classification of real property for
purposes of taxation with a system of de jure classification. It
expands, substantially, the legal remedies available to real property owners aggrieved by the valuations placed upon their properties by the assessing authorities. It probably entails a devolution upon the Cook County Board of a substantial portion of the
discretionary power heretofore exercised by both the Cook
County Assessor and Board of Appeals with regard to the valuation of real property for tax purposes. And, finally, it would
appear to require legislation in the near future by the General
Assembly and the Cook County Board, lest a chaotic situation
arise, regarding the assessment and collection of real property
taxes in Cook County.
I.
CLASSIFICATION OF REAL PROPERTY FOR PURPOSES OF TAXATION

Classification of real property for purposes of taxation
connotes a division of real property such that realty included in
certain classes will be subject to a higher tax, while realty placed
in other classes will be subject to a lesser tax than would be the
case were there no such classification. Phrased somewhat differently, by such classification is meant a division of realty calculated to affect markedly the incidence of taxation among the
individual pieces of real property so classified. Such classification, however, is based solely on the characteristics of the real
property itself. Factors such as the form of ownership, whether
by an individual, partnership or corporation, and the particular
trade or business, if any, of the user are considered irrelevant.
Within the framework of an annual ad valorem property
tax, such classification might take one of two forms: varying the
rate of tax from class to class; or levying the same rate of tax
for all classes, but varying the tax base, the percentage of actual
value at which property is assessed for tax purposes, from class
to class. Given the Illinois system of a single tax rate applicable
*

B.A., J.D., Harvard University.
CONST. art. IX, §4 (1970).

1 ILL.
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to all taxable property in a given taxing district, classification
of real property for purposes of taxation means that realty included in different classes will be assessed at varying percentages of actual value.
Deliberate discrimination is the essence of such a classification. Given that all of the taxable property in Cook County is to
be assessed at the average rate of 50 percent of actual value,
it is obvious that if some classes of property (e.g., single-family
homes) are assessed at, for example, 25 percent of actual value,
then other classes or types of property (e.g., commercial property such as office buildings and factories) must be assessed at,
about, 75 percent of actual value. Needless to say, in such a
situation it is in the interest of the owners of real property in
disfavored classes to invalidate the classification system in
effect, and compel assessment and taxation on a non-classified
basis. Again assuming an average assessment of 50 percent of
actual value, the owner of property placed in a class destined to
be assessed at 75 percent of actual value could reduce his tax by
one-third by invalidating the classification system.
II.
TAXATION OF REAL PROPERTY IN COOK COUNTY
UNDER THE 1870 CONSTITUTION

With regard to the taxation of real property, the operative
provisions of the 1870 Constitution were contained in section 1,
article IX, the Revenue Article:
"The general assembly shall provide such revenue as may be
needful by levying a tax, by valuation, so that every person and
corporation shall pay a tax in proportion to the value of his, her
or its property-such value to be ascertained by some person or
persons, to be elected or appointed in such manner as the general
assembly shall direct, and not otherwise.... -2

The first clause of section 1 clearly provided for a non-classified property tax, proscribing the classification of property for
purposes of taxation, as that term has heretofore been defined.3
Admittedly, property could be classified, however, for certain
other purposes, as in connection with the administration of the
assessment process.4 Thus, the General Assembly could provide
ILL. CONST. art. IX, §1 (1870) (emphasis added).
3 Cushman, The Proposed Revision of Article IX of the Illinois Constitution, 1952 U. ILL. L.F. 226, 235; Comment, The Illinois Constitutional Requirement of Uniformity of Taxation 33 ILL. L. Ray. 57, 61-62 (1938);
People ex rel. McDonough v. Grand Trunk Western R. Co., 357 Ill.
493,
497-99, 192 N.E. 645, 647 (1934).
4For an example of classification for purposes of assessment, as distinguished from classification for purposes of taxation, see People ex rel.
Toman v. Packard, 377 Ill. 610, 614, 37 N.E.2d 330, 332 (1941):
2
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that railroad property would be assessed by the State Department of Revenue, while other property would be assessed locally.
Personal property might be assessed by certain officials
and real property by others. Rural realty might be equalized
for assessment purposes separately from urban real estate. 6 But
except for rare and distinguishable dicta, the Illinois Supreme
Court has never deviated from the view that this clause requires all property to be taxed uniformly; that is, at the same
percentage of actual value. 7 As recently as 1968, the supreme
court said, construing section 1:
[The] constitution recognizes no difference between real and
personal property nor does it make any distinction between tangible and intangible personal property. It allows the legislature
wide latitude but requires uniformity. The Revenue Act enacted
under this constitutional grant provides that all real and personal
property in the State shall be assessed and taxed, except so much
thereof as may be exempt by the Act, and that all such property
subject to assessment shall be assessed at its fair cash value.8
However, the second clause of section 1, the emphasized
language, had far reaching and probably unintended effects.
This language was held by the courts to preclude direct judicial
review of any valuation of real property made by the several
[The] principle of law upon which the rule of uniformity in taxation
stands does not require that the taxing officials, while engaged in the
fixing of the full fair cash value of property, shall adopt the same rules as
to all classes of property. They are permitted to exercise their judgment, formulate and apply such rules in the valuing of the various items
of property and the classes thereof as will best enable them to arrive
at the fair cash value of the property which is the subject of assessment.
5 People ex rel. Ruchty v. Saad, 411 Ill. 390, 397, 104 N.E.2d 273, 277
(1952).
6 Budberg v. County of Sangamon, 4 Ill. 2d 518, 123 N.E.2d 479 (1954);
People ex rel. Lunn v. Chicago Title and Trust Co., 409 Il. 505, 515, 100
N.E.2d 578, 584-85 (1951); People ex rel. Lindsey v. Palmer, 113 Ill. 346,
348, 1 N.E. 830-31 (1885).
7 The dicta are in People ex rel. Toman v. Olympia Fields Country Club,
374 Ill. 101, 103, 28 N.E.2d 109-10 (1940): "No prohibition against classification of property and taxpayers into different classes can be read into the
Constitution"; and People v. Southwestern Bell Tel. Co., 377 Ill. 303, 307,
36 N.E.2d 362, 364 (1941): "The constitution does not prohibit a classification of property and taxpayers." See Cohn, Constitutional Limitations on
Taxation in Illinois, 1961 ILL. L.F. 586, citing both the Olympia Fields
and Southwestern Bell decisions:
A tax on income as property would assume the validity of legislative
power to classify property for purposes of taxation. It is not seriously
suggested by any student of the problem that such a power exists, notwithstanding some judicial dicta to the contrary.
Id. at 611. Comment, Taxation of Intangibles under the Illinois General
Property Tax, 35 ILL. L. Rnv. 716 (1941), referring to Olympia Fields:
The court may have confused the permissive classification which the
Constitution authorizes (when certain specified classes of businesses are
to be taxed by the legislature) in the second half of §1 of Article IX,
with the uniformity requirement of the first half of that section.
Id. at 726 n.57. For similar comments on the Southwestern Bell decision,
see Troupis, Full Fair Value Assessment in Illinois, 44 ILL. L. REV. 160,
177-78 n.101 (1949) ; Young, Taxpayers' Remedies, 1952 U. ILL. L.F. 248, 271.
8 People ex rel. Hamer v. Jones, 39 Ill. 2d 366-67, 560, 235 N.E.2d 589,
593 (1968).
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assessing authorities, leaving an aggrieved taxpayer the sole
remedy of a bill in equity only in situations so extreme as to
constitute "constructive fraud." A summary of the judicial
construction of these words, which appear in both the 1870 and
1848 Illinois Constitutions, is set forth in the leading case of
Bistor v. McDonough :"
[Section] 1 of article 9 of the Constitution requires the value
of property for taxation to be ascertained by some person or persons to be elected or appointed in such manner as the general
assembly shall direct, and not otherwise. The power to impose
burdens and to raise money is a legislative power, and may be
exercised only by or under the authority of the Legislature. The
persons elected or appointed, pursuant to section 1 of article 9
of the Constitution, to ascertain the value of property for the
purposes of taxation, are exclusively invested with that power,
and courts may not exercise it.
[Under] section 1 of article 9 of the Constitution, the courts,
in the absence of fraud, have no power to review the valuation of
property made by the proper officers for purposes of taxation.
For an excessive or unequal assessment, where the complaint is
not fraud but an error of judgment merely, the sole remedy is an
application for an abatement to such statutory agencies as have
been provided for hearing the complaint.
[The] statutory provisions concerning the taxpayer's right to
have the assessors' valuation of his property for taxation reviewed
by the board of review are intended to provide adequate protection
against fraudulent or oppressive assessments. It is only where
a valuation of taxable property has been fraudulently made and
the complaining taxpayer has not waived his right to relief that
the assessment is subject to judicial review. The jurisdiction of
a court of equity may not be invoked against a fraudulent assessment of taxable property where the owner has failed to insist upon
a legal remedy which would have afforded him complete relief.
He must show that he has been diligent in pursuing his remedy
to have the assessment corrected by the board of review in that
he was prevented from pursuing such remedy by fraud, accident,
or mistake ...
An administrative appeal to the board of review in counties
other than Cook and to the Board of Appeals in Cook County,
was provided.' 0 However, a further direct appeal to the courts
from the valuations of the local assessor was not allowed, and
all attempts to provide such further direct judicial review
failed."
9 348 Ill. 624, 629-31, 181 N.E. 417, 419-20 (1932). See also Republic
Life Ins. Co. v. Pollak, 75 Ill. 292, 295 (1874) ; People ex rel. Nordlund v.
S.B.A. Co., 34 Ill. 2d 373, 376, 215 N.E.2d 233, 235 (1966).
10 ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 120, §§588-89, 598-99 (1871).
1' White v. Board of Appeals of Cook County, 45 Ill. 2d 378, 380, 259

N.E.2d 51, 52-53 (1970) ; Sanitary Dist. of Chicago v. Bd. of Review of Will

County, 258 Ill. 316, 318, 101 N.E. 555-56 (1913) ; Keokuk & H. Bridge Co.
v. People, 185 Ill. 276, 279, 56 N.E. 1049-50 (1900). But see Springfield Ma-
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The aggrieved taxpayer had a right to judicial relief, to
what came to be termed indirect judicial review, only in cases

so extreme that a court of equity would intervene to prevent
"constructive fraud."

The five generally accepted categories of

constructive fraud were: (1) assessment so excessive that it
could not have been honestly made; (2) assessment made by
mere will without the exercise of judgment; (3) assessment

arbitrarily made in disregard of recognized elements of value;
(4) assessment made in violation of rules; and (5) intentional
and systematic discrimination.12 Specifically, it was generally
believed, until quite recently, that judicial relief premised solely
on the ground of a fraudulently excessive assessment was unlikely unless the assessment in question was at a percentage of
actual value three or four times the prevailing or average level
of assessment.'' In Cook County, where the prevailing level of
assessment has been about 50 percent of the actual value of real

property, 1 4 this meant that a specific parcel would have to be
assessed at more than 150 percent of its actual value before the
courts would intervene on the ground of constructive fraud.

rine Bank v. Property Tax Appeal Bd., 44 Ill. 2d 428, 256 N.E.2d 334 (1970),
and Will County Ed. of Review v. Property Tax Appeal Bd., 48 Ill. 2d 513,
272 N.E.2d 32 (1971) in which the supreme court reviewed decisions of the
Property Tax Appeal Board of the Department of Revenue, established by
ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 120, §§592.1-.4 (1971), without any reference to the
question whether section 1 of article IX of the 1870 Constitution barred any
such judicial review.
12 This whole matter is considered at length in Cushman, The Judicial
Review of Valuation in Illinois Property Tax Cases, 35 ILL. L. REV. 689
(1941); Young, Taxpayers' Remedies, 1952 U. ILL. L.F. 248; and Wattling,

Taxation of Real Property in Cook County - The "Railroad Cases" and
the Future of De Facto Classification,1 JOHN MAR. J. OF PRAC. & PROC. 212,
221-27 (1968).
13 See Gale, Assessment and Collection of Taxes, 1952 U. ILL. L.F. 102,
196; Comment, The Illinois Constitutional Requirement of Uniformity in
Taxation, 33 ILL. L. REV. 57, 67, n.60 (1938).
However, in People cx rel.
County Collector of St. Clair County v. American Refrigerator Transit Co.,
33 Ill. 2d 501, 504-05, 211 N.E.2d 694, 697 (1965), the court held as a matter of law, that an overassessment of 78 percent or more constitutes constructive fraud:
[Appellant] also argues that the judgment must be reversed since there
was no finding of fraud in 'any shape, form or fashion.' It is clear that
fraud, either actual or constructive, must be proved in order to sustain
the judgment. However, we do not think it necessary that there be an
express finding of fraud if the evidence supports such a conclusion.
Here, the evidence clearly shows that the appellee's property, after application of the multiplier, was assessed at $158,500.00 and that its actual
fair market value was $161,000.00. Thus, appellee's property was assessed at approximately 98 per cent of its full fair market value, while
other locally assessed property was assessed at only 55 per cent of full
fair market value. This, in our opinion, was tantamount to constructive
fraud and supports the trial court's judgment that appellee is entitled
to a refund. [98% - 55% = 43%; 43%/55% = 78.2%].
See also People ex rel. Dallas v. Chicago, Burlington and Quincy R.R., 26
Ill. 2d 292-94, 186 N.E.2d 335-36 (1962), where the court indicated that an

overassessment of 81.8% would constitute a constructively fraudulent discrimination.
14 See People ex rel. Korzen v. Chicago, Burlington and Quincy R.R.,
32 Ill. 2d 554, 209 N.E.2d 649 (1965).
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Obviously such restricted judicial review of assessments
afforded the assessing authorities a wide area within which
they could classify real property for purposes of taxation, without fear that such assessments might be challenged successfully
in court. Consequently, both successive County Assessors of
Cook County and Boards of Appeals took full advantage of this
situation to erect a comprehensive system classifying real property for purposes of taxation. 15 It must be emphasized that
such classification was not authorized by either the Constitution
or statute; indeed, it was contrary to the specific provisions of
both the Constitution of 1870 and the Revenue Act.'6 Such
classification was instead predicated upon the fact that the assessor, within certain broad limitations, could and did "get
away with" systematic illegal and unconstitutional action.
The illegal and unconstitutional status, under the Constitution of 1870, of the Cook County system of classification of real
property for purposes of taxation, was demonstrated in the leading case of Aldrich v. Harding 7 where the Cook County authorities were so imprudent as to admit, by demurrer, the very
existence of the system. In that case the plaintiff had brought
suit to enjoin the collection of taxes for 1927 on certain real
property in the City of Chicago. A demurrer to the bill having
been overruled, the collector elected to stand by it, and a decree
was entered granting the relief prayed by the plaintiff. The
collector appealed, and the Illinois Supreme Court, per curiam,
affirmed.
[T he bill also alleged the board of assessors and board of review . . . planned to make unequal and un-uniform assessments in
Cook County . . . that knowing the average assessments of real
estate throughout the State was 40 per cent of the full value, the
authorities stated publicly that they would assess residence property at 25 per cent of its full value and business property at 60
per cent; that with the knowledge of average assessments throughout the state and being charged with the duty of equalizing
assessments, the members of the board of review stated that on
certain downtown streets the assessed value was as high as 80
per cent and in some cases 100 per cent of full value.
[The] valuation of property for taxing purposes must be the
result of honest judgment and not of mere will. An assessing
body has the right, and it is its duty, to exercise its own judgment
in determining values, but it has no right to fix a valuation by its
will, alone, without the exercise of judgment. In Pacific Hotel
Co. v. Lieb, 83 Ill. 602, the court said that where the valuation is
so grossly out of the way as to show that the assessor could not
IFSee Ill. Dept. of Rev., PROP. TAX STAT. - 1969, 199 (1971) ; Fisher,
An Economist's Appraisal of the Illinois Tax System, 1961 U. ILL. L.F. 543,
580.

1 ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 120, §§501-02 (1971).
17 340 Ill. 354, 172 N.E. 772 (1930).
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have been honest in his valuation - must reasonably have known
that it was excessive - it is accepted as evidence of a fraud upon
his part against the tax-payer, and the court will interpose ...
[Under] the numerous decisions of this court the property
owner is entitled to a fair and honest exercise of judgment in
assessing property. Where intent or design is sought to be shown
or is materially involved, consideration may always be given to
collateral facts and circumstances.
[I]n the instant case it is apparent that the differences in
value of the various kinds of property could not have been the
result of differences of opinion but were arbitrary and willful
on the part of the taxing authorities. The allegations of the bill,
we think, satisfactorily show that appellee could not have obtained relief against the arbitrary, willful, and apparently fraudulent assessments made, in any proceeding before the taxing or
reviewing bodies, and he necessarily sought a court of equity in
8
which to proceed.'

Thus the term "de facto classification" was derived, so long
employed to describe the classification system in effect in Cook
County under the Constitution of 1870, in contradistinction to
"de lure classification" of real property for purposes of taxation.
III.
TAXATION OF REAL PROPERTY IN COOK COUNTY
UNDER THE 1970 CONSTITUTION

The real estate tax provisions of the 1970 Illinois Constitution are contained in section 4 of article IX, the Revenue Article. They provide as follows:
Section 4. Real Property Taxation
(a) Except as otherwise provided in this Section, taxes upon
real property shall be levied uniformly by valuation ascertained
as the General Assembly shall provide by law.
(b) Subject to such limitations as the General Assembly may
hereafter prescribe by law, counties with a population of more
than 200,000 may classify or continue to classify real property for
purposes of taxation. Any such classification shall be reasonable
and assessment shall be uniform within each class. The level of
assessment or rate of tax of the highest class in a county shall
not exceed two and one-half times the level of assessment or rate
of tax of the lowest class in that county. Real property used in
farming in a county shall not be assessed at a higher level of assessment than single family residential real property in that
county.' 9
18Id. at 358-60, 172 N.E. at 774-75; see also to the same effect, People
ex rel. McCallister v. Keokuk and H. Bridge Co., 287 Ill. 246, 249-50,
122 N.E. 467-69 (1919) ; People ex rel. McDonough v. Schmuhl, 359 Ill.
446-49, 194 N.E. 731-33 (1935) ; People ex rel. McDonough v. Grand Trunk
Western R. Co., 357 Ill. 493, 192 N.E. 645 (1934).
19 ILL. CONST. art. IX, §4 (1970).
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Most importantly, of course, section 4 (b) permits the "de lure
classification" of real property in Cook County and some five
other counties having populations of more than 200,000 for purposes of taxation.
Of almost equal importance, section 4 also accomplishes the
following results in Cook County:
(a) It eliminates the pre-existing restrictions on judicial
review of tax assessments, the restrictions upon which
the Cook County Assessor had built his system of de
facto classification.
(b) It vests the power to classify real property for purposes of taxation in the County Board, leaving the
County Assessor a mere ministerial function in that
regard, unless the County Board should specifically
otherwise provide.
A.

Direct JudicialReview of Real Property Assessments

The real estate tax provisions of the 1970 Illinois Constitution do not contain the words "such value to be ascertained
by some person or persons, to be elected or appointed in such
manner as the general assembly shall direct, and not otherwise",
or any similar language. Moreover, the legislative history of
these provisions in the proceedings of the 1970 Illinois Constitutional Convention indicates that this omission was deliberate
and with full knowledge that the scope of judicial review of
20
valuations made for tax purposes would thereby be increased.
The original proposal of the Committee on Revenue and
Finance was as follows:
Section 4.1 Real Property Taxation
[A ny county over 200,000 population is authorized to classify
real property for taxation purposes. The General Assembly shall
establish a system of classification of real property for taxation
purposes, which system may be adopted by any other county in
lieu of uniform taxation of real property. In any county the level
of assessment or the rate of taxation of the highest class shall
not be more than two and one-half
times the level of assessment
21
or rate of tax of the lowest class.
This proposal did not meet with general approval when
considered by the full convention and after extensive debate in
the Committee of the Whole, Delegate John Karns, the Chairman of the Committtee on Revenue and Finance, proposed a
20 The reports of the Committees on Revenue and Finance, and Style,
Drafting and Submission are silent on the question of judicial review of real
property assessments.

21

REC. OF PROC., SIXTH ILL.

No. 2, Vol. VII at 2058 (1969-70).

CONST. CONY.

Comm. on Rev. and Fin. Prop.
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"compromise,"

which, with some modification, became subsections 4(a) and 4(b) of the present Revenue Article. The
Karns proposal was:
Taxes upon real property shall be levied uniformly by valuation
which shall be ascertained in such manner as the General Assembly shall provide by law. Provided, that subject to such limitations as the General Assembly may hereafter prescribe by law,
counties may classify or continue to classify real property for purposes of taxation. Any such classification shall be reasonable and
assessments shall be uniform within each class. Real property
level of assessused in agriculture shall be assessed at the same
2
ment as single family residential real property.

During the course of the debate which followed in the Committee of the Whole on his proposal, Delegate Karns answered
several questions regarding the meaning and effect of his proposal. In this part of the debate, the following two exchanges
took place between Delegate Karns and Delegates Leahy and
Gertz:
Mrs. Leahy: Does your sentence "any such classification shall be
reasonable and assessment shall be uniform with any class", does
that sentence provide the ability for challenges to assessments
that do not exist today in Cook County?
Mr. Karns: I would say that it well might, Mrs. Leahy. As I
understand the courts have picked on the expression determined
by some person I believe, as "the General Assembly shall direct
and not otherwise" as the - one of the reasons for denying judicial review. That type of provision, you will notice, is not in here.
Mrs. Leahy: [S]o you would see this sentence as providing some
type of protection from arbitrary and capricious assessments, if
such should exist?
Mr. Karns: Yes.
Mrs. Leahy: Thank You.
Mr. Gertz: Now, earlier you suggested that judicial review might
be possible. Would you be amenable to inserting some phrase or
clause which would make judicial review more likely in certain
circumstances?
Mr. Karns: I would not, personally, because I do not personally
see the need for expanded judicial review. This is my own opinion
in this matterMr. Gertz: Wouldn't judicial reviewMr. Karns: - but I certainly think it is possible under this provision. I would not spell it out any more than that - that it is
not proscribed by the provision.
Mr. Gertz: Wouldn't judicial review be limited to fraud, and there
might be other circumstances including unreasonable classification 22

Id., Daily Jour., vol. 1 at 363 (1969-70).
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Mr. Karns: Well, certainly fraud and unreasonable classification
and perhaps other circumstances.
2
Mr. Gertz: Thank you. 3

These two conversations are the sole references to the question
of judicial review of real property assessments in the legislative history of subsections 4(a) and 4(b) of article IX, the
Revenue Article, of the 1970 Constitution.
It is a commonplace of statutory construction that where a
statute is amended or revised, it will be presumed that the purpose of the amendment was to change the existing law. 24 There
is no question but that the 1970 Illinois Constitutional Convention, by substituting section 4 of article IX as to real property
taxation, and section 5 as to personal property taxation, intended
to change substantially, indeed drastically, the constitutional
provisions concerning the taxation of property, both real and
personal, contained in section 1 of the Revenue Article of the
1870 Constitution.
It is also commonplace that it must be presumed that a
legislature is cognizant of court decisions construing a law,
and that drastic changes in the phraseology of a law which has
been judicially construed indicate an intent to change that
law. 25 As previously noted, the words "such value to be ascertained by some person or persons," contained in both
the 1870 Constitution and the 1848 Constitution, had been construed by the courts in numerous decisions over more than a
century as precluding direct judicial review of real property
assessments and permitting indirect judicial review only where
the taxpayer could show that the assessment was actually or
constructively fraudulent. As stated by the Illinois Appellate
Court:
When the Legislature revises a statute it must be presumed that

the Legislature took cognizance of the prior decisions of the
courts construing and interpreting the prior law. If, after a
statute has been construed and interpreted, the Legislature makes
radical changes in phraseology, an intention is thereby shown'to
establish a rule different from that announced by the courts.
Where by amendment or revision, words are stricken from a statute it must be concluded2 that the Legislature deliberately intended to change the law. '1

Not only must it be presumed that the 1970 Constitutional
Convention was cognizant of cases such as Bistor v. Mc23 Id., Verbatim Transcripts,vol. III at 2023 (1969-70).

24Sutherland,

STATUTES

AND

STATUTORY

CONSTRUCTION

§22.30

(4th

ed., Sands, 1972) ; City of Chicago v. Jewish Consumptives Relief Society of
Chicago, 323 Il. 389, 154 N.E. 117, 118 (1926).
2534 ILLINOIS LAW AND PRACTICE, Statutes §161, n.11.
26 Town of The City of Champaign v. Overmeyer's,

2d 523, 152 N.E.2d 752, 754 (3d Dist. 1958).

Inc., 18 Il1App.
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Donough,27 and the legal significance of the words "such
value to be ascertained ... .", but the significance of those words
and of the line of cases construing them was brought specifically to the attention of the Convention by the delegate who was
both Chairman of the Committee on Revenue and Finance and
sponsor of the proposal which was to become subsections 4(a)
and 4(b) of the Revenue Article. 28 It is also clear from the
Karns-Gertz colloquy that the failure to substitute for such
words any other language restricting or defining the scope of
judicial review of real property assessments also was deliberate."
Under these circumstances, the conclusion is inescapable
that the 1970 Constitutional Convention knowingly and deliberately eliminated from the 1970 Constitution any and all restrictions on judicial review of real property assessments. Thus, in
the constitutional commentary to section 4 of article IX it is
noted: "[Nlothing in Section 4 requires continuation of the doctrine developed by the courts under the 1870 Constitution that
no judicial review is allowed with respect to individual assessments. ' ' 3° Significantly, the co-author of this constitutional
commentary, Wayne W. Whalen, was a delegate to the Convention and Chairman of its Style, Drafting and Submission
Committee, which was charged with putting the Revenue Article, and other articles, into final form. Accordingly, it would
appear that, for the first time in 124 years, direct judicial review is now possible in Illinois from the valuation decisions of
the assessing authorities. More specifically, no longer is it
necessary in a separate proceeding to establish that the assessment in question was actually or constructively fraudulent.
Also, as indicated, the Convention declined to explain the
precise extent of such expanded judicial review of the valuation made by the assessing authorities. Rather, in effect, this
was left to the courts themselves. As an example, assume that
a certain class of property is to be assessed at 50 percent of its
actual value, and that the actual value of a certain parcel included within such class is $100,000. The courts could intervene
and reduce the assessment if the assessment were, say $52,500;
or they could decline to intervene and do so only if the discrepancy between the assessment made and the proper assessment
was somewhat greater, say, $60,000 rather than $50,000. The
matter would appear to be left completely to the sole discretion
of the courts.
27 348 Ill.
624, 181 N.E. 417 (1932).
28 Note 23 supra.
29 Id.
30 ILL. REV. STAT. CONST. art. IX,

§4(b), Commentary, (1971).

98

The John Marshall Journal of Practice and Procedure

[Vol. 6:87

And, of course, the courts could act if the Cook County Assessor, in assessing property, endeavored to act beyond his
power by classifying property for purposes of taxation, or
changing pre-existing classifications where he had no authority
to do so, or in cases where a classification was challenged as unreasonable, or by violating the requirement that "assessment
shall be uniform within each class."
The question naturally arises concerning the form of such
proceedings for direct judicial review of the assessments made
by the Cook County Assessor and Board of Appeals. The Administrative Review Act is by its terms inapplicable:
This Act shall apply to and govern every action to review
judicially a final decision of any administrative agency where the
Act creating or conferring power on such agency, by express
reference, adopts the provisions of this Act. In all such cases,
any other statutory, equitable or common law mode of review of
decisions of administrative agencies heretofore available shall
not be employed after the effective date hereof. 31
Although the Revenue Act provides for an administrative appeal to the Board of Appeals, it fails to provide for any further
administrative or judicial review. 32 Moreover, the Act establishing the Property Tax Appeal Board, which does provide for
review of the decisions of that board under the provisions of the
Administrative Review Act, specifically does not apply to Cook

County.33
A proceeding in equity would appear inappropriate, at least
initially. Equity jurisdiction in such cases, under the 1870 Constitution, was founded on the absence of an adequate remedy at
law, by way of direct judicial review, and also on the basic requirement that to obtain any judicial relief, it was required that
the taxpayer show actual or constructive fraud, long in itself an
independent basis for equitable jurisdiction. 4 However, under
the 1970 Constitution, direct judicial review of the decisions of
the Cook County Board of Appeals is now possible, and a showing of fraud, either actual or constructive, is no longer necessary.
At present, pending action by the General Assembly pro31 ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 120, §265 (1971).
32
1d., §§594-99 (1971).
33
Id., §592.1 (1971).
In any county other than a county of over 1,000,000 population, any
taxpayer dissatisfied with the decision of a board of review as such

decision pertains to the assessment of his property for taxation purposes,
or any taxing body that has an interest in the decision of the board of
review on an assessment made by any local assessing officer, may, within

20 days after the date of written notice of the decision of the board of
review, appeal such decision to the Property Tax Appeal Board for

review.
34

flistor v. McDonough, 348 Ill. 624, 181 N.E. 417 (1932).
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viding some other remedy, as a proceeding under the Administrative Review Act, a taxpayer's remedy would appear to be
by common law writ of certiorari. Thus, in People ex rel.
Brenza v. Chicago & North Western Ry., 3 a case involving the
question whether the Tax Commission had correctly determined
that certain property of a railroad was non-carrier real estate
and as such assessable by local assessors, the court said:
We recognize that while section 138 of the Revenue Act,
(par. 619) related to assessments made by the Tax Commission,
it is quite evident that rule 18 of the Tax Commission was intended to provide for a review of the Tax Commission's classification of railroad property. In any event, if no method of review is provided by statute or rule, the action of the Tax Commission may be tested or reviewed by the writ of certiorari,
by requiring a production of the record to determine whether it
36
has exceeded its powers.

Jarman v. Board of Review,"7 relied upon by the supreme
court in the Brenza case, involved the action of the Board of
Review of Schuyler County in assessing alleged omitted personal property of the decedent for the years 1921 to 1928, inclusive. The circuit court quashed a writ of certioraridirected
to the board of review, and the executrix of the estate appealed.
The supreme court reversed and remanded with directions to
quash the proceedings of the board of review, holding that its
action in assessing property was judicial in nature and might
be reviewed by the common law writ of certiorari, since no
method of direct review was provided by statute. The court
also rejected the argument that the writ of certiorariwould not
lie because an adequate remedy was available to appellant in
the form of a bill in chancery to enjoin collection of the tax.
The court noted that "where no fraud is charged against the
board of review and all that is claimed is an illegal exercise of
unquestioned powers, chancery is without jurisdiction."
However, there would appear to be serious inconveniences
attached to reliance upon the common law writ of certiorarias
the principal avenue of direct review of decisions of the Cook
County Board of Appeals. Under this procedure, the reviewing
court, that is to say, the Circuit Court of Cook County, would be
restricted to a review of the record made before the Board of
Appeals; thus, new evidence might not be considered.8 8 Conse35 411 Ill. 85, 103 N.E.2d 85, 91 (1952).
36
345 I1. 248, 178 N.E. 91 (1931)

(emphasis added).

For a similar result see Stone v. Board of Review of Pike County,
354 Ii1. 286, 188 N.E. 430 (1933).
38 People ex Tel. Fosse v. Allman, 329 Ill. App. 296, 299-303, 68 N.E.
2d 203-06 (1st Dist. 1946); Funkhaeser v. Coffin, 301 Ill. 257, 260-61, 133
N.E. 649-50 (1922).
31
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quently, both the taxpayer and the State's Attorney, representing the Cook County Assessor, would have to present their respective cases, in their entirety, at the hearings before the Board
of Appeals. Neither could rely, as under the 1870 Constitution,
upon the consideration that the proceeding in the circuit court
would be a new proceeding, an equity suit predicated upon the
contention that the challenged assessment was actually or constructively fraudulent.
There are about 1,259,000 separate parcels of real property
in Cook County for assessment purposes, about one-fourth of
which are reassessed each year.3 9 Given the greatly increased
scope of judicial review under the 1970 Constitution, it is probable that there will be a substantial increase in the number of
suits challenging the assessments made each year by the Cook
County Assessor. It is doubtful if a single tribunal, the Board
of Appeals, could possibly give a full and adequate hearing in
each case. More likely, the Board of Appeals would become
a veritable "bottle neck," greatly complicating the extension and
collection of real property taxes for years to come.
Admittedly, under the Administrative Review Act, the
same result would follow were that Act applied without modification:
Every action to review any final administrative decision
shall be heard and determined by the court with all convenient
speed. The hearing and determination shall extend to all questions of law and of fact presented by the entire record before the
court. No new or additional evidence in support of or in opposition to said finding, order, determination or decision of the administrative agency shall be heard by the court. The findings
and conclusions of the administrative agency on
questions of fact
40
shall be held to be prima facie true and correct.
There is nothing to prevent the General Assembly, however,
from providing that in proceedings under the Administrative
Review Act to review decisions of the Board of Appeals, the
circuit court could hear and consider additional evidence. Also,
application of the Administrative Review Act would have the
further and incidental advantage of obviating extensive historical research, by both the bench and bar, into the origins and
evolution of the common law writ of certiorari.
Application of the Administrative Review Act to proceedings before the Board of Appeals, with an unrestricted right in
both parties to adduce additional evidence before the circuit
court, would shift, in effect, the primary or initial burden of
31Note 23 supra at 2009.
ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 120, §274 (1971)

40

(emphasis added).

19721

Rcal Property Taxation

trying contested valuation cases from the Board of Appeals to
the circuit court. Such a transfer appears inevitable, however,
considering the greatly increased scope of judicial review under
the 1970 Constitution. The Circuit Court of Cook County has
the personnel to establish numerous tribunals for this purpose.
The Board of Appeals, which is but a single tribunal, cannot be
expected to cope with the volume of litigation, regarding the
valuation of real property for tax purposes, which is almost certain to arise in Cook County under the new Revenue Article.
It should be noted that proceedings under the Administrative Review Act would be largely limited to valuation questions.
Challenges to "legislative" decisions under subsection 4(b),
such as the "reasonableness" of the classifications adopted, would
appear to require a different procedure, such as a suit for an
4
injunction or for a declaratory judgment. 1
B.

The Effective Date of the New Revenue Article,
and of State and Local Legislation Thereunder

The Illinois Constitution of 1970 took effect, with exceptions which are not here relevant, on July 1, 1971.42
In Illinois, the Revenue Article provides that the liability
for real estate taxes attaches and becomes a lien on January 1
of each year, although the tax is not due and payable until the
succeeding year. 43 Thus, real property taxes for the year 1971
attached and became a lien on January 1, 1971, although they
were not due and payable until well into 1972. Similarly, real
estate taxes for the current year, 1973, attached and became a
lien January 1, 1973, even though they will not be due and payable until next year, 1974.
The Illinois Supreme Court had occasion to consider the
interrelationship of these two provisions in Doran v. Cullerton,"
This case involved 'the so-called homestead exemption; an exemption of $1,500 assessed valuation of "real property that is
occupied as a residence by a person 65 years of age or older who
is liable for paying real estate taxes on the property and is the
owner of record of the property or has a legal or equitable interest therein . . . except for a leasehold interest." The statute
granting the exemption specifically stated that it applied to assessments for the year 1971 for taxes payable in 1972, and for
all subsequent years thereafter.
41 Artz v. Comm. Nat'l Bk. of Peoria, 125 Ill. App. 2d 86, 259 N.E.2d
813-14 (3d Dist. 1970).
42 Doran v. Cullerton, 51 Ill. 2d 553, 557, 283 N.E.2d 865-67 (1972).
43 ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 120, §508(a) (1971).
44 51 Ill. 2d 553, 283 N.E.2d 865 (1972).
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The supreme court, in Hoffman v. Lehnhausen,45 had previously held such an exemption to be unconstitutional under the
1870 Constitution. However, section 6 of article IV of the 1970
Constitution specifically provided that "the General Assembly
by law may grant homestead exemptions or rent credits."' 4
In Doran, the court held the homestead exemption statute
valid for assessments made in 1972 and subsequent years, and

invalid for assessments made in 1971 for taxes payable in 1972.
The court advanced two reasons for its decision. First, under
the 1870 Constitution, the statute was clearly unconstitutional
for the half year prior to July 1, 1971, the effective date of the
1970 Constitution, and there was no indication that the legislature intended the exemption to be effective for only part of a
year. Secondly, that even if the legislature had so intended, the
Exemption Act would still be invalid for the entire year 1971 by
reason of the January 1 lien date.
Additionally, the date upon which real estate is assessed in
the State of Illinois is January 1 of each year (Ill. Rev. Stat.
1971, ch. 120, par. 508a), and since on January 1, 1971, the Illinois constitution of 1870 was the paramount law of this State,
is not applicable for any portion of the
the homestead exemption
47
year in question.
The implication of this latter aspect of the court's holding
is that no change in the real property law, which shifts the burden of tax from one class to another, in this case from owners
of residential real property who are 65 years or older to all
other real property owners, is valid for a given assessment year
unless such change is made prior to January 1 of that year.
48 Ill.
2d 323, 269 N.E.2d 465 (1971).
ILL. CONST. art. IX. §6 (1970).
47 51 Ill.
2d 558, 283 N.E.2d at 867.
A county ordinance probably could adopt, or modify, retroactively, a
system for the classification of real property for purposes of taxation without
contravening the Constitution of the United States. See Walsh v. Henry,
305 U.S. 134. 147-48 (1938). And in Thorpe v. Mahin, 43 Il.2d, 633, 250
N.E.2d 633. 641 (1969), the supreme court quoted with apparent approval.
this somewhat delphic statement: "Although it is the rule generally recognized
that revenue laws may be retroactive, it is also true that there is a point
of time when such retroactivity is beyond the legislative power." See City
Nat'l Bk. of Clinton v. Iowa State Tax Comp., 251 Iowa 603, 102 N.W.2d
381, 383 (1960); Commonwealth v. Budd Co., 379 Pa. 159, 108 A.2d 563,
568-69 (1954).
However, as indicated in Doran v. Cullerton, the supreme court implies
that it will impose a more restrictive test under the Illinois Constitution of
1970 than would be required by the Constitution of the United States. If
so, this would not be the first such development in the historic relationship
between the Supreme Court of Illinois and the Supreme Court of the United
Sfates. See Heimgaertner v. Benjamin Electric Mfg. Co., 6 Ill. 2d 152,
157-58, 128 N.E.2d 691, 695 (1955) ("pay-while-voting"' statute) ; cf. DayBright Lighting, Inc. v. Missouri, 342 U.S. 421 (1952).
See also Lake
Shore Auto Parts Co. v. Korzen. 49 Ill. 2d 137, 273 N.E.2d 592 (1971), rev'd
,qnb nom. Lehnhausen v. Lake Shore Auto Parts Co., 93 S. Ct. 1001 (1973)
(Validity of Illinois constitutional provision exempting personal property
of individuals only from ad valorem taxation).
4

46
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With respect to subsection 4 (b) of the Revenue Article and the
five counties other than Cook, with populations of more than
200,000, which presumably did not classify real property for
purposes of taxation prior to July 1, 1971, this would mean that
under Doran they could not classify for the assessment year
1971. Further, that if they wished to do so for the assessment
year 1972, they would have to make such election and adopt a
system of classification prior to January 1, 1972.
With respect to Cook County, the provision in subsection
4(b) -"or
to continue to classify real property for purposes
of taxation," would appear to indicate that Cook County could
elect to keep a classification system in effect during the assessment year 1971. In brief, there would not necessarily exist in
Cook County a one-year hiatus, 1971, between the years 1970
and prior, when there was in effect a de facto system of classification, and the years 1972 and subsequent, when there might
be classification de jure.
But even as to Cook County, the Doran case would appear to
pose certain problems for the future. Specifically, any change
in the classification system would have to be made prior to the
start of a year if such change were to be effective for that year.
Thus, if it was desired to reduce assessments on single-family
homes from 25 to 20 percent of actual value, with no like change
in the percentages applicable to other classes of real property,
such reduction would have to be made prior to January 1, 1974,
if it was to be applicable for the assessment year 1974, even
though taxes for that year would not be payable until 1975.
In one respect, however, section 4 of the Revenue Article of
the 1970 Constitution would appear to have a retroactive effect,
notwithstanding the effective date of July 1, 1971 for the Constitution and the lien date of January 1, 1971 for 1971. real
property taxes.
As previously noted, classification of property for purposes
of taxation was not authorized by the Revenue Article of the
1870 Constitution, which instead mandated a uniform non-classified property tax. Classification of real property for purposes
of taxation existed in Cook County, de facto but not de jure,
solely because of the restrictions placed upon judicial relief for
aggrieved taxpayers by the words "such value to be
ascertained by some person or persons, to be elected or appointed in such manner as the general assembly shall direct,
and not otherwise," and the construction placed upon those
words by the courts.
There was no question but that the owner of property as-
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sessed at 75 percent of its fair market value, while the prevailing or average level of assessment was 50 percent of fair
market value and numerous other properties were being assessed at but 25 percent of their fair market value, was thereby
deprived of his rights under the 1870 Constitution, and suffered
in a very real and practical sense, a legal wrong. It was
merely that he lacked an effective judicial remedy to compel the
responsible public officials, the Cook County Assessor and Board
of Appeals, to obey the Constitution and the Revenue Act.
The so-called "Railroad Cases" of the early 1960s demonstrated that given years of effort and sufficient incentive,
determined taxpayers and ingenious counsel could find a way to
compel recalcitrant assessing officials to obey the constitutional mandate as to uniform taxation of real property.48
Accordingly, it would appear that the change in Illinois
law resulting from the deliberate elimination from the Revenue
Article, in the 1970 Constitution, of the magic words - "such
value to be ascertained . . . . ", falls within the rule that
when a change of law merely affects the remedy or law of procedure, all rights of action will be enforceable under the new
procedure, without regard to whether they accrued before or
after such change of law and without regard to whether the
9
action had already been instituted.4
The traditional objection to retroactive application of a
new law, that such application would violate vested rights, is
inapplicable. r
Neither those benefiting from the de facto
system, nor the assessing officials themselves, can be heard to
say that they had a vested right in the systematic and deliberate violation of the Illinois Constitution of 1870.
It would appear, therefore, that in all pending cases involving Cook County and real property taxes for 1971 and prior
years, the procedural restrictions of the 1870 Constitution no
4 People -ex rel. Korzen v. Chicago, Burlington and Quincy R.R., 32
Ill. 2d 554, 209 N.E.2d 649 (1965) ; People ex rel Musso v. Chicago, Burlington and Quincy R.R., 33 Ill. 2d 88, 210 N.E.2d 196 (1965) ; People ex rel.
Wenzel v. Chicago and North Western R.R., 28 Ill. 2d 205, 190 N.E.2d 780
(1963) ; People ex rel. Enrietta v. Gulf, Mobile and Ohio R.R., 29 Ill.
2d
605, 195 N.E.2d 174 (1963) ; People ex rel. Dallas v. Chicago, Burlington and
Quincy R.R., 26 Ill. 2d 292, 186 N.E.2d 335 (1962); People ex rel. Hillison
v. Chicago, Burlington and Quincy R.R., 22 Ill. 2d 88, 174 N.E.2d 175
(1961) ; People ex rel. Kohorst v. Gulf, Mobile and Ohio R.R., 22 Ill. 2d
104, 174 N.E.2d 182 (1961). See Wattling, Taxation of Real Property in
Cook County - The "Railroad Cases" and Future of De Facto Classification,
1 JOHN MAR. J. OF PRAC. & PROC. 212, 250-63 (1968).
49 34 ILLINOIS LAW AND PRACTICE, Statutes §194 (1958) ; Nelson v. Miller,

11 Il.2d 378, 143 N.E.2d 673 (1957) ; Ogdon v. Gianakos, 415 Il.591, 597,
114 N.E.2d 686, 690 (1953).
50See 34 ILLINOIs LAW AND PRACTICE, Statutes §193 (1958); Nelson
v. Miller, 11 Ill.
2d 378, 383, 143 N.E.2d 673, 676 (1957) ; United States v.
Bradley, 83 F.2d 483-85 (7th Cir. 1936).
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longer apply; and specifically, it is no longer necessary to prove
actual or constructive fraud. That is to say, a taxpayer would
be entitled to relief if he could show any appreciable variance
between the percentage of actual value at which his property
was assessed and the average or prevailing level of assessment
in Cook County for the assessment year in controversy.
C.

Locus of Power To Classify Real Property
for Purposes of Taxation
The first sentence of subsection 4(b) of article IX, the
Revenue Article, of the 1970 Constitution provides as follows:
[S]ubject to such limitations as the General Assembly may
hereafter prescribe by law, counties with a population of more
than 200,000 may classify
or continue to classify real property
5
for purposes of taxation. 1
This language clearly grants two types of options to the six
counties which presently have a population of more than
200,000:
1. In the case of the five counties other than Cook, having
populations in excess of 200,000, the option to classify
real property for purposes of taxation.
2. In the case of Cook County, the option to continue to
classify real property for purposes of taxation.
The options under section 4(b), to classify or to continue
to classify real property for purposes of taxation are granted
to "counties." It is axiomatic that the powers of the county
as a body corporate or politic are exercised by the County
Board, and that a county can act only through its board. 2 Accordingly, it would appear that the power to classify or to
continue to classify real property in Cook County for purposes
of taxation is vested in the Cook County Board.
A further reason for concluding that the power granted to
Cook County under subsection 4(b) is vested in the County
Board and not in the County Assessor is the consideration that
the Cook County Assessor is not a true constitutional officer
since his office is not necessarily a permanent fixture of county
government. Under subsection 4(c) of article VII of the 1970
Constitution, the office of County Assessor of Cook County
could be abolished at any time by a county-wide referendum or
by a statute passed by the General Assembly53 The power
granted by subsection 4 (b) of article IX is of great importance.
ILL. CONST. art. IX, §4(b) (1970).
ILLINOIS LAW AND PRACTICE, Counties §18 (1958); Hardin v.
County of Sangamon, 71 Ill. App. 103, 111 (3d Dist. 1896); Sexton v.
County of Cook, 114 Ill. 174, 179-80 28 N.E. 608-09 (1885).
53 ILL. CONST. art. VII, §4(c) (1970).
51

52 14
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It is hardly conceivable that the Constitution would vest it in
an official whose office might at any time cease to exist. On
the other hand, under subsection 3(b) of article VII, a county
5
board is to be elected in each county.

4

Moreover, the Constitutional Convention had before it an
example of a Revenue Article vesting considerable powers with
respect to the classification of real property in the County Assessor of Cook County. Section 13 of the proposed Revenue
Article, submitted to the voters at the General Election of November, 1966, was a "grandfather" provision preserving generally, and legalizing, the de facto classification system as it then
existed in Cook County. The section also granted the County
Assessor of Cook County broad discretionary power, within certain limits, to modify that system.5 5 Thus, the Constitutional
Convention had before it a precedent, so to speak, for vesting
such powers in the County Assessor, and saw fit not to follow it.
The legislative history of subsection 4 (b) on this question
is somewhat ambiguous, 56 but it indicates that the power to classify or to continue to classify is presently in the Cook County
Board, subject, possibly, to transfer to the County Assessor,
either by Act of the General Assembly or by ordinance of the
County Board delegating all or part of such power.
The proposed Revenue Article, submitted by the Committee
on Revenue and Finance, provided with respect to the classification of real property for purposes of taxation, that: "any county
over 200,000 population is authorized to classify real property
57
for taxation purposes.1
The committee report in turn contained this comment:
[A]

county of more than 200,000 population may continue its

ILL. CONST. art. VII, §3 (b) (1970).
55 H. R. JOUR. RES. No. II, L. 3780-83, §13 (1965).
56 Of course, reference to the legislative history of subsection 4(b) is
itself in order only if the meaning of that subsection can be said to be doubtful or ambiguous. In Burke v. Snively, 208 Ill. 328, 70 N.E. 327 (1904), the
court stated:
The constitution of a State derives its force and authority from the
vote of the people adopting it. For that reason it is a general rule that in
construing the provisions of a constitution the words employed therein
shall be given the meaning which they bear in ordinary use among the
people. The natural and ordinary meaning of the word is to be accepted
except where a word is used the meaning whereof is established by
statute or by judicial construction.
54

In construing constitutional provisions the true inquiry is, what was the
understanding of the meaning of the words used by the voters who
adopted it? Still, the practice of consulting the debates of the members
of the convention which framed the constitution, as aiding to a correct
determination of the intent of the framers of the instrument, has long
been indulged in by courts as aiding to a true understanding of the
meaning of the provisions that are thought to be doubtful.
Id. at 340, 344-45.
57 Note 21 supra.
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present classification practices or establish a system of classification by action of the county governing board without any
further approval from the General Assembly.'8

Thus, the Convention's Committee on Revenue and Finance
clearly was of the opinion that where a county was empowered
to classify real property for purposes of taxation, such power

was vested in the county board.
During the debate in the Committee of the Whole, Delegate
Knetch, the Vice Chairman of the Committee on Revenue and
Finance, moved to amend the Committee's proposal by substituting the words - "The county board of any" for the word
"any", so that it would be explicit that the power to classify was
in the county board5 9 The amendment was debated at some
length, and adopted by a vote of 59 in favor to 41 opposed.o
During the debate, Delegate McCracken, who might be described
as the Convention spokesman for the Cook County Assessor, opposed the Knetch amendment on the ground that he believed
that the Assessor should be the official possessing the power to
classify real property."' Other delegates expressed the opinion
that the amendment was unnecessary, since the power was
clearly in the county board under the Committee's language,
and that the Knetch amendment would deprive the General Assembly of the power, which it would otherwise have, to designate the official or officials, county board or assessor, who would
have the power to classify real property for purposes of taxation
in counties where such classification was permissible."
Subsequently, the Karns "compromise" was substituted for
the Committee proposal. Delegate Knetch again proposed an
amendment that the power to classify be vested explicitly in
the county board,63 which after a brief debate was defeated by
a voice vote. 4 The principal argument against the amendment
was that there might not always be a county board, and that
the power should therefore not be vested in a body which might
cease to exist.65
At no time during the debates on the two Knetch amendments was it suggested that either the original Committee draft
or the Karns compromise would themselves vest the power to
classify in the assessor.6 6 At most, it would appear that several
58 Id. at 2108.
59 Note 23 .uw"a
60

Id. at 1997.

at 1989.

61 Id. at 1990-91.
62
63
64

Id. at 1991-97.
Id. at 2023-24.
Id. at 2024.

65 Id.
6G Id. at 1989-97, 2023-24.
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delegates thought that the General Assembly by statute, or the
Cook County Board by ordinance, would be able to vest in the
Cook County Assessor the power to classify real property for
purposes of taxation.
Absent such legislation, however, and there has been none
at either the state or county level, the power to classify would
appear clearly to be in the Cook County Board and not in the
Cook County Assessor.
With regard to the power of the General Assembly, attention should also be given to a proposed real estate assessment plan or system advanced early this year by Mr. Harry
Semrow, a member of the Cook County Board of Appeals, and
Senator Cecil Partee, the Minority Leader of the Illinois Senate.
Their plan, calculated to encourage the erection of new buildings and tlhe improvement of existing ones, would provide essentially as follows:
1. New buildings would be assessed at 20 percent of the
regular rate the first year after completion, at 40 percent the second year, and so forth; only for the fifth
year after completion and subsequent years would the
structure be assessed at 100 percent of the regular rate.
2. The increase in the value of existing structures resulting from improvements would be treated in the same
manner as the cost of new buildings for assessment purposes.
This assessment plan or system would be adopted by the General Assembly through a general law applicable to all 102
7
counties of the State.6
The Semrow-Partee proposal, whatever its other merits
or demerits, is subject to a fatal defect; it is blatantly unconstitutional. There would seem to be no question that the Semrow-Partee proposal on its face involves a classification of real
property for purposes of taxation. New construction and improvements less than one year old would be assessed and taxed
at 20 percent of the rate applicable to like construction or
improvements which are four years or more in age. Similarly,
there would be a separate class for structures that were more
than one year but less than two years old, and so forth.
With reference to real property, subsection 4(b) of the
Revenue Article restricts classification of real property for
purposes of taxation to some six counties: Cook and the other
five counties having populations in excess of 200,000. As to the
other 96 counties, there is no power in anyone to classify real
07 Chicago Daily News, Feb. 28, 1973, at 7, col. 2, Id. Jan. 12, 1973, at
12, col. 1.
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property for purposes of taxation. They are instead governed
by subsection 4(a) which mandates that " . . . taxes upon real
property shall be levied uniformly by valuation ....
"68

As to the six counties where classification of real property
for purposes of taxation is permitted, such classification is
optional. The decision to classify or not to classify in each
case would appear plainly to lie not with the General Assembly, but with the legislative body of each of the counties; the
several county boards.
Under subsection 4(b), the power of the General Assembly, with reference to the six counties where classification of
real property for purposes of taxation is permitted, is restricted by these words: "Subject to such limitations as the
General Assembly may hereafter prescribe by law. . . ."GO That
is to say, the General Assembly's power is strictly negative.
It may not compel any of the counties in question to classify
real property for purposes of taxation nor may it forbid any
of them to do so. Its power is restricted to those of the six
counties which do elect to classify real property for purposes
of taxation; as to them, the General Assembly may impose
"limitations" on the classification systems they choose to adopt.
With specific reference to the Semrow-Partee plan or
system, a county, for example, Cook, might elect to classify real
property for purposes of taxation, and the General Assembly
probably could proscribe adoption of that particular plan or
system. Yet, it could not impose the proposed plan or system
upon the county.
D.

Uniformity Requirement and the Quadrant
System of Assessment

Subsection 4(b) of the present Revenue Article provides
as follows:
(b) Subject to such limitations as the General Assembly may
hereafter prescribe by law, counties with a population of
more than 200,000 may classify or continue to classify real
property for purposes of taxation. Any such classification
shall be reasonable and assessments shall be uniform within
each class. The level of assessment or rate of tax of the
highest class in a county shall not exceed two and one-half
times the level of assessment or rate of tax of the lowest
class in that county. Real property used in farming in a
county shall not be assessed at a higher level of assessment
than single family residential real property in that county. 70
08

ILL.

6
9Id.
70

Id.

CONST. art. IX, §4(a), (b) (1970).
§4(b) (1970).
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This subsection, particularly the last sentence thereof, and also
the preceding sentence relating to the maximum variance between classes, clearly contemplates that classification will be
made on a county-wide basis; the same rules for classifying
property would apply throughout the county. Of course, the
requirement that "assessments shall be uniform within each
class" also would have a county-wide application.
Similar language was contained in the Revenue Article
of the 1870 Constitution with respect to non-property taxes.
The second clause of section 1 provided that the "General Assembly shall have power to tax peddlers, auctioneers, brokers
. . . in such manner as it shall from time to time direct by
' 71
general law uniform as to the class upon which it operates.
Moreover, it was early held that this language entailed statewide uniformity as to any tax imposed by the General Assembly
72
pursuant to that clause.
This requirement for county-wide uniformity may cause
considerable distress, particularly since the Cook County Assessor has recently proceeded to make substantial changes in
the classification system heretofore in effect.
Cook County is divided into four areas, or quadrants, for
purposes of real property assessment. Property in each quadrant is in turn reassessed every four years. 73 Thus, in 1972
the Assessor reassessed the property in the so-called north
quadrant, the area of Chicago north of the main branch of
the Chicago River and several of the north suburbs. In 1973
he is to reassess the property in the northwest quarter of the
city and in the northwest suburbs; in 1974 the west quadrant,
and in 1975 property in the south quadrant7 4 will be reassessed.
Prior to 1972 the Cook County Assessor grouped real
property into some forty-four classes for assessment purposes. 75 Each class was assessed pursuant to various formulas contained in a manual used by the Assessor's office.76
These formulas resulted in valuations for assessment purposes
which had no necessary relationship to the market value of
7
the property.
Early in 1972, the Real Estate Research Corporation submitted a report to the Cook County Assessor recommending
ILL. CONST. art. IX, §1 (1870) (emphasis added).
State R.R. Tax Cas., 92 U.S. 575, 611-12 (Ill. 1875).
3 ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 120, §524 (1971).
74 ICCH STATE TAX REP., 111, 22-107A (1969).
7vChicago Sun-Times, April 18, 1972, at 3, col. 1; but see statement of
Delegate McCracken that only five categories intentionally assessed at dif71
72

7

ferent levels. Note 23 supra at 2006.

76 Note 23 supra at 2006.
77 Chicago Daily News, May 5, 1972, at 5, col. 3.
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substantial changes in the assessment practices of his office.
The number of classes was to be sharply reduced to, say, a
total of eight. Property in each class would then be assessed
at specified percentages of fair market value, within the variThus, if the lowest
ance limitations of subsection 4(b) .78
assessed class was assessed at 20 percent of fair market
value, the other seven classes would be assessed at ascending
percentages of fair market value to a maximum of 50 percent
for the highest assessed class.
The Assessor's office announced that it intended to accept
the recommendations of this report, and apply the new system
to the assessment which it would make in the north quadrant
during the year 1972.79 It soon became apparent that the new
assessment formula was producing higher assessed values than
before; higher assessments, in many instances, than would have
been the case under the classification system used by the As80
sessor's office in prior years.
It would seem clear, therefore, that in Cook County, assessments are not "uniform within each class" as required by
subsection 4(b) of the Revenue Article. Specifically, assessments in the north quadrant are on a basis different from those
currently in effect in the remaining three quadrants, which
were assessed under the old system. Assuming that the Assessor's office continues with its new approach during 1973, in
connection with its reassessments of real property in the northwest quadrant, property in that quadrant will likewise be on a
basis different from those that will still be in effect in the
west and south quadrants. This situation will continue through
the year 1975, by which time all real property presumably will
have been reassessed according to the same classification system, and assessments will be "uniform within each class" on
a county-wide basis, as required by subsection 4 (b) of the
8
Revenue Article. 1
Until such point is reached, however, those assessed pursuant to the new classification system would appear to have a
valid objection to the assessed values placed upon their property, if those values exceed the amounts which would have been
reached under the classification system and formulas employed
82
by the Assessor's office in 1971 and prior years.
7SId. May 13, 1972, at 10, col. 5; Id. May 11, 1972, at 7, col. 2.
9 Id. May 5, 1972, at 5, col. 3.
SOId. May 10, 1972, at 1, col. 4.
81 ILL. CONST. art. IX, §4(b) (1970).

82 Once the Cook County Assessor has determined, by the end of the
year 1975, the fair market value of all parcels of real property in Cook
County, it should thereafter be possible, although cumbersome, to modify the
classification systems - as by increasing or decreasing the percentage of
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Here, too, would appear to be a source of substantial litigation for the next several years.
IV.
ACTION

BY

COOK

COUNTY

AUTHORITIES

REVENUE ARTICLE OF THE

1970

UNDER

THE

CONSTITUTION

The operative words of subsection 4(b) of the Revenue
Article are largely confined to the following: "Ec]ounties with
a population of more than 200,000 may classify real property
for purposes of taxation. ' 83 This language very clearly grants
two types of options to counties:
1. In the case of the five counties, other than Cook, having
populations in excess of 200,000, the option to classify
real property for purposes of taxation.
2. In the case of Cook County, the option to continue to
classify real property for purposes of taxation.
In the event of failure by any of these counties to exercise
the option, taxation of real property in that county would
appear to be governed by the general provision of subsection
4(a) : "Except as otherwise provided in this section, taxes
upon real property shall be levied uniformly by valuation as4
certained as the General Assembly shall provide by law.""1
That is to say, real property in such a county would be assessed and taxed on a non-classified basis.
Insofar as Cook County is concerned, the question whether
the county would or would not exercise its option to continue
to classify real property for purposes of taxation was for the
Cook County Board to decide. Certainly, for reasons already
adumbrated, this was not a matter to be decided by the Cook
5
County Assessor.
Also, as previously discussed, absent either a state law or
a county ordinance vesting such power in him, the Cook County
Assessor lacks the power, under subsection 4 (b), to classify
real property for purposes of taxation; that is to say, to make
changes in the classification system that is in effect, if in fact
one be in effect.8 0
The Cook County Board has not yet taken any formal
action "to continue" in effect the de facto system of classifiactual value at which various classes are assessed - as to all the land in
the county in a single year; and, of course, if this were done, there would be
no violation of the uniformity clause of subsection 4 (b).
83 ILL. CONST. art. IX, §4(b) (1970).
84
Id. §4 (a).
8.1 See pp. 105-109 supra.
86 Id.
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cation in existence on July 1, 1971, the effective date of the
7
present Constitution.
In March, 1972, Michael L. Igoe Jr., the Secretary of the
Cook County Board, wrote Edward V. Hanrahan, the State's
Attorney of Cook County, requesting his opinion whether:
"1) it is or is not the duty of the County Board to classify real
estate for the purposes of taxation; or 2) it is or is not the
duty of the Assessor of Cook County to classify real estate for
the purpose of taxation."8 8 Under date of March 20, 1972 the
State's Attorney responded with his legal opinion, wherein,
after quoting subsection 4 (b) of article IX and subsection 4 (d)
of article VII, he concluded:
Based on these constitutional provisions and the absence of
any statutory provisions requiring such classification, I am of
the opinion that neither the County Board nor the Assessor of
Cook County has any duty to classify real property for tax purposes.
Historically, the Assessor of Cook County has classified real
property for taxation purposes. The recent Constitutional Convention recognized that fact, and both Article IX, section 4(b)
and Article VII, section 4(d) of our present constitution allow
the County Assessor to continue this practice.
However, pursuant to Article VII, section 4(d) of the present constitution, the County Board has been given the power to
alter functions hstorically performed by the County Assessor.
It has been given the power and may also establish a system of
classification of real property for taxation purposes pursuant to
Article IX, section 4(b) of the present Constitution. Consequently, the County Board can, if it desires, pass a real property
classification ordinance.
In the event that the County Board passes such a classification ordinance, or an ordinance prohibiting classification of
real property for taxation purposes, it would be binding upon
the Assessor of Cook County."
Subsequently, the Finance Committee of the Cook County
Board held a hearing on the subject of classification of real
property, at which appeared representatives of some twelve
to fifteen civic and taxpayer groups.90
Then, on April 3, 1972, the Cook County Board adopted
the following resolution:
Now, THEREFORE,

BE IT RESOLVED, that the Cook County

Board directs the Assessor to submit, after consulting with representatives of the groups who appeared at the public hearing
87 See Doran v. Cullerton, 51 Ill.
2d 553, 557, 283 N.E.2d
8" OP. STATE'S ATT'Y OF COOK COUNTY No.1402 (March

865-67 (1972).
20, 1972).

89 Id.
90 BD.

OF COMM'RS

(April 3, 1972).

OF

COOK

COUNTY

JOUR.

OF

PROCEEDINGs

at

2567
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and any other group or individual having an interest in the

classification of real estate, a recommendation for the classification of real estate in Cook County as soon as possible. 91
During the summer of 1972, the office of the Cook County
Assessor held a series of public hearings, with a professor of
law as hearing officer, to consider the question of the classification of real property in Cook County. At these hearings
individuals and representatives of several groups presented
their views concerning the classifications which should be established, and the varying percentages of actual value which
should be employed in assessing different types of classes of
92
property.
There has been no public announcement, to April 1, 1973,
that the Cook County Assessor has made a recommendation to
the Cook County Board for the classification of real estate in
Cook County as required by the County Board's resolution of
April 3, 1972. Nonetheless, as previously noted, the Cook County
Assessor has proceeded to make substantial changes in the
classification system in effect prior to January 1, 1972.1 And
the County Board has yet9 4 to adopt any resolution electing to
continue the de facto classification system effective July 1, 1971,
or making any changes in that system, or delegating to the
Cook County Assessor the power to make such changes.
In evaluating the legal significance of the above happenings or nonhappenings, the following must be kept in mind.
First, the County Board Resolution of April 3, 1972 was
clearly not a delegation to the Cook County Assessor of all or
any part of the County Board's power to classify real property
for purposes of taxation. The Cook County Assessor was directed merely to consult with interested groups and "to submit
•

. .

a recommendation for the classification of real estate in

Cook County." Nor can the Resolution be read as a final decision by the County Board that there should or should not be
classification of real property for purposes of taxation.95
Second, the reliance of the State's Attorney on section
4(d) of article VII would appear to be misplaced. Subsection
(d) provides that:
(d)

County officers shall have those duties, powers and

9' BD. OF COMM'RS OF COOK COUNTY
INGS at 2567 (April 3, 1972).

REs. 72-R-142, Joun.

OF PROCEED-

92 Chicago Sun-Times, Sept. 8, 1972, at 84, col. 1; Id. Aug. 18, 1972, at
82, col. 2; Chicago Daily News, Aug. 3, 1972, at 1, col. 4; Chicago Tribune,
July 28, 1972, sec. 2, at 10, col. 3; Chicago Daily News, Aug. 3, 1972, at 1,

col. 4.
1'

Chicago Daily News, May 13, 1972, at 10, col. 5.
at 7, col. 1.

94 Id. Mar. 1, 1973,
95 Note 91 supra.
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functions provided by law and those provided by county ordinance. County officers shall have the duties, powers or functions
derived from common law or historical precedent unless altered
by law or county ordinance. 96

On the basis of this subsection, the State's Attorney concluded:
Historically, the Assessor of Cook County has classified real
property for taxation purposes. The recent Constitutional Convention recognized that fact, and both Article IX, section 4(b)
and Article VII, section 4(d) of our present Constitution
allow
7

the County Assessor to continue this practice9

. As previously shown, the wording and legislative history
of article IX, section 4 (b) is conclusive that the power therein
granted to classify real property for purposes of taxation is
vested, at least in the first instance, in the County Board, and
not in the County Assessor. The power might be transferred
or delegated, however, to the Assessor by statute or county
ordinance, but this has not been done? 8 And, of course, on
this basis subsection 4(d) of article VII is inapplicable. It is
a well-established rule of construction that where an enactment contains two provisions, one general and the other
particular, and both relate to one subject, the particular or
specific provision must prevail and be treated as an exception
to the general rule, 99 In this case, subsection 4(b) of article
IX, dealing with the classification of real property in certain
counties, is clearly the particular provision, while subsection
4(d) of article VII, dealing with the powers of all county
officers and all counties, is the general provision within the purview of this rule.
The legislative history of article VII, subsection 4(d)
also indicates that it is unavailable to support any claims by
the County Assessor that he is empowered, absent a statute
or ordinance, to classify real property pursuant to subsection
4(b) of the Revenue Article. Subsection 4(d) of article VII
was aimed at a series of decisions under the 1870 Constitution
involving sheriffs and county treasurers, which had held that
where the Constitution established an office without prescribing
the duties of the officer holding it, and the office was of common law origin or long standing, then in that event the General Assembly was without authority to revoke any of the
powers and duties of the officer as they had existed at the time
96

97

ILL. CONST. art. VII, §4(d) (1970).

Note 88 supra.

98 See pp. 94-101 supra.
o9 Ashton v. County of Cook, 384 Ill. 287, 51 N.E.2d 161. 165-66 (1943)
People ex rel. Fore v. Missouri, Pac. R.R., 342 Ill. 226, 173 N.E.2d 816-17

(1930); Havlik v. Marcin, 270 N.E.2d 189, 191 (1st Dist. 1971).
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of the adoption of the Constitution. 100 Under subsection 4 (d),1'
these decisions are inapplicable since such common law or
customary powers or duties can be altered either by statute
or by county ordinance.
These decisions, however, whatever their applicability to
other powers, functions, or duties of the Cook County Assessor,
would not be applicable to the question of the power of the
assessor to classify real property for purposes of taxation
under the present Constitution, for the present Constitution
dealt both specifically and negatively with this question. On
the one hand, the new Revenue Article eliminated the restrictions on direct judicial review of real property assessments
upon which the de facto system of classification had been
based. It destroyed the legal foundations, such as they were,
for the de facto classification of real property by the Cook
County Assessor.102 Phrased somewhat differently, to the extent that there was an historical precedent for classification of
real property by the Cook County Assessor, it had been predicated solely on certain words in the Revenue Article of the
1870 Constitution - " . . . such value to be ascertained by
some person or persons . . . , which were omitted deliberately
from the Revenue Article of the present Constitution.
On the other hand, subsection 4 (b) of the new Revenue Article substituted for the de facto system thus destroyed an optional de jure system, and vested the power to classify in the
county board and not in the county assessor.10 3
Under these circumstances, it would in no event be necessary to look to historical precedent to determine what powers
the county assessor had with respect to the classification of
real property. Subsection 4(b) of the Revenue Article is clear
that he has none, unless the county board sees fit to delegate
some or all of its powers to him.
Moreover it should be remembered that the classification
of real property for purposes of taxation by the Cook County
Assessor was at all times contrary to the Revenue Article of
the 1870 Constitution and the Revenue Act.10 4 Indeed, after
cases such as Aldrich v. Harding105 had shown that it was le100 REC. OF PRoc., SIXTH ILL. CONST. CONy., ComM. of Loc. Gov't

Maj.

Prop., Vol. VII at 1708-10 (1969-70) ; Id., Verbatim Transcripts, Vol. IV at

3287-92 (1969-70). See People ex rel. Walsh v. Bd. of Comm'rs of Cook
County, 397 Il1. 293, 74 N.E.2d 503 (1942); People ex rel. County of Du
Page v. Smith. 173 N.E.2d 485, 492-93 (1961); Dahnke v. People, 168 Ill.
102, 48 N.E. 137 (1897).
'0' ILL. CONST. art. VII, §4(d) (1970).
102 See pp. 83-93, supra.
103 See pp. 105-109, supra.
104 See pn. 88-93, supra.
105 340 Il1. 354, 358-60,

172 N.E. 772, 774-75 (1932) ; People ex rel.
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gally fatal to admit that real property was being so classified,
the assessor and his staff apparently took pains to deny, in
court, that they were doing so. As recently as December,
1972, in a case involving the 1971 assessments of certain parcels of realty, present and former members of the assessor's
staff admitted that real property was classified for tax purposes. Within a few days, most of them returned and in open
court recanted their prior testimony to this effect. 106 It would
seem that a practice so clearly illegal that its very existence
had to be denied in court by those involved is hardly an "historical precedent" within the contemplation and meaning of
subsection 4(d) of article VII of the present Constitution.
The Illinois law is clear that repetitions of unconstitutional
acts cannot make such acts valid. 101 It is doubtful, therefore, that the Cook County Assessor's de facto system of classification was an historical precedent within the meaning of
subsection 4 (d) of article VII.
It would appear from the foregoing that the Cook County
Board, having failed to exercise the options granted to it
under subsection 4 (b) of the Revenue Article, for the assessment years 1971, 1972, and 1973,108 would be governed by the
general provisions of subsection 4(d) prohibiting the classification of real property for purposes of taxation. It would
further appear that the changes in the classification system
made by the County Assessor in 1972 were made without legal
authority and are therefore void. In any event, the Cook
County Board should certainly enact an ordinance adopting a
valid classification system, and defining what, if any, powers
the Cook County Assessor shall have with respect to the classification of real property for purposes of taxation.
McDonough v. Schmuhl, 359 Ill. 446, 449, 194 N.E. 731, 733 (1935) ; People
ex rel. McDonough v. Grand Trunk Western R.R., 357 Ill. 493, 192 N.E.
645 (1934).
1O6 Chicago Daily News, Dec. 19, 1972, at 2, col. 1.
107 See Burke v. Snively, 208 Ill. 328, 356, 70 N.E. 327, 335 (1904).
los As previously noted, see p. 102 supra, it would appear that an ordinance enacting or modifying a system for the classification of real property
for purposes of taxation must be adopted prior to January 1 of the year
for which it is to take effect. On this basis, it is now too late for the

Cook County Board to adopt an ordinance providing for the classification

of real property in Cook County for the years 1972 and 1973.
Although it is probable that the words "or to continue to classify" were
intended to permit the Cook County Board to adopt, at some date in 1971
after the effective date of the Constitution, July 1, 1971, an ordinance electing
to continue to classify real property pursuant to the de facto system of
classification theretofore in effect, see p. 103 supra, such question is now
moot, since the Cook County Board at no time during the year 1971 adopted
such an ordinance, or indeed any ordinance relating to the taxation of real
property for the purposes of taxation.
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CONCLUSION

The Revenue Article of the 1970 Illinois Constitution has
made substantial changes in the law governing the taxation of
real property in Cook County. It has greatly increased the
prospects of successful litigation by taxpayers aggrieved by
the valuations placed upon their properties for tax purposes.
It has vested very substantial powers regarding the taxation of
real property in the County Board, and, conversely, has greatly
diminished the discretionary powers of the County Assessor and
the Board of Appeals.
Regrettably the County Board, County Assessor, and
State's Attorney have failed both to recognize the significance
of these changes and to take the action necessitated by them.
As a result they have increased needlessly the prospects of
litigation successfully challenging the validity of assessments
made during the past two years and the current year.
Immediate action by the County Board is needed to regularize the classification of real property for purposes of taxation and to fix the respective powers of the Board and the
County Assessor. Legislation should also be adopted by the
General Assembly to govern the newly available right of taxpayers to direct judicial review of decisions of the County
Assessor and Board of Appeals.
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